Based on my interests and profile on Academia.edu, I was invited to comment on a preprint paper by Edervaldo José de Souza Melo, an independent researcher in Brazil. The title immediately piqued my interest because it suggests a link between biological evolution and phenomenology, a feature which is seldom offered in consciousness studies. In “Simulation, Self, and the Phenomenal Field: An Evolutionary Hypothesis on Consciousness,” Melo offers an explanatory framework which accounts for the organization of subjective experience.1 He states that consciousness is “the phenomenological manifestation of an evolutionary simulation system” and “emerges from the interaction of three fundamental dimensions,” namely:
- “the neural integration of sensory information originating in the external environment”
- “the continuous influence of internal bodily states, including interoceptive and affective signals”
- “the capacity of the nervous system to simulate and anticipate possible scenarios prior to action”2
Melo goes on to explain that this model is not “merely computational” and states that it is “structured as a phenomenal field organized around a bodily located point of view.” This is the important part because he stresses that organisms do not “merely process information about the world” but instead “experiences the world from its own perspective as an embodied agent.”
Here, Melo is acknowledging that something similar to computation is going on, but reframes consciousness in terms of phenomenological and biological principles. While we can interpret biological functionality in terms of computation, it’s important that we start moving away from these metaphors. For one, this framing moves descriptions of physiological processes away from the realm of natural systems to formal systems, which misrepresents the phenomena in question. We have such a robust understanding of various biological and physiological processes that to frame them in terms of formal systems and computation is unnecessarily reductive. Back in the 1950’s and 60’s, it made sense why some might be tempted to classify biological functions in terms of computers, but today, this is generally a bad move to make. The other reason this is not an ideal way of describing organisms and natural phenomenon is due to the rise and anthropomorphization of artificial intelligence. Framing cognition, physiology, and biological processes in terms of computers only contributes to the questions and misunderstandings surrounding what AIs are and how they work. We need to be working on clarifying the differences between computers, AIs, and biological organisms, not contributing to the further conflation of the two.
Melo’s paper goes on to explain his position and the significance of memory, affect, and bodily states for generating conscious awareness and a sense of self. He also describes how internal modelling and predictive processing are adaptive capacities that organisms developed through natural selection, which is where this idea of ‘simulation’ enters the story. Melo discusses how the ability to anticipate future events from past experiences is a significant feature of conscious experience, which of course, immediately reminded me of Rosen and his ideas from Anticipatory Systems.
Although Melo claims that his framework is “largely neutral”3 regarding the metaphysical questions surrounding consciousness, this paper provides hints at his beliefs regarding the existence of subjectivity in general. In section 7.4 he states “rather than being a mere byproduct of neural complexity, consciousness may therefore represent an adaptive mode of information organization that allows organisms to anticipate and navigate future possibilities.”4 Later in section 9, he articulates how biological organisms gradually evolved more sophisticated neural integration and representational capacities to “adapt their behaviour in response to changing environmental conditions”5 Sensing that we seem to be on the same wavelength, I asked him why he remained neutral regarding the metaphysical problems. To me, it was an easy move to claim that organisms have subjective experiences because they provide motivation to respond to sensations and predictions in specific ways. His hypothesis seems to be headed in that direction anyway, so why not make the connection here? Melo responded by stating that a discussion of the hard problem with respect to his hypothesis was better addressed in a separate publication, and that introducing it here would leave the argument too open-ended or too superficial. He did, however, concede that motivation, feelings, and value are important for explaining subjectivity, specifically in how an organism “transforms information into significance.” I really like this phrasing because it suggests a connection to attentional processes and how certain stimuli might be deemed more salient than others.
This article and brief exchange with Melo has reenergized me and renewed my drive to research and write on consciousness. The last few months have been a challenge and recently, it was brought to my attention that I was experiencing burnout. I was burnt out from grad school and working on my thesis, and my job has only contributed to this since I defended and graduated last summer. I wasn’t sure what kind of career I wanted to pursue or how to get out of the rut I found myself in, but today, things are turning around. I am going to continue where I left off and make it work.
Back in 2025, Axel Cleeremans, and Liad Mudrik, and Anil Seth published “Consciousness science: where are we, where are we going, and what if we get there?” which presents an overview of our current understanding and directions for the future of a theory of consciousness. While it does mention “predictive processing” as a theory of brain function, it analyzes it from a neuroscience perspective, rather than a philosophical one. The authors state that the value of this theory is that it provides “resources for developing and testing systematic or explanatory correlations between brain processes and properties of conscious experience”6 which may be true, but when it comes to the phenomenon of consciousness, we are still too narrowly focused on the brain. A shift in perspectives is needed because it’s the body and organism as a whole we should be looking at with respect to developing a theory of consciousness. The authors are remain interested in empirical predictions resulting from existing theories of consciousness, which investigate the issue from the wrong point of view. Rather than determining whether Global Workspace Theory, Higher-Order Theory, Integrated Information Theory, or Predictive Processing Theory provides the best explanation, we need to forget about the brain for a minute and consider how bodies and organisms function as operationally closed systems. While the authors understand an interdisciplinary approach is needed, they believe that philosophers of science are of particular benefit. Because there is a lot of conceptual work to be done in this area, for example, articulating definitions, analyzing conceptual foundations, and discussing constraints research, philosophy of science can help iron out these fundamental details. Melo took a similar stance in his paper, claiming that any theory must provide an explanatory model for consciousness, one which identifies the biological function of subjectivity.7 His hypothesis serves as a “case study in how scientific models are constructed to explain multi-level phenomena within the life sciences,” where the examination of models “remains a central task for the philosophy of science.”8 Clearly, philosophers of science provide key insight for developing a theory of consciousness, but we also need philosophy of biology.
The article by Cleeremans, Mudrik, and Seth concludes with an overview of the scientific, clinical, ethical, and societal implications that a theory of consciousness would introduce. Topics like animal welfare, prenatal policy, medicine, neurotechnology, and human enhancement are all interesting and important, but the domain that I feel is the most significant is artificial intelligence. As agents, robots, and chatbots continue to improve, we will need to understand how these technologies are distinct from biological organisms. Otherwise, we will draw conclusions based on their behaviours and functional similarities to brains or organisms, potentially leading to negative outcomes in the future.
My raison d’être is therefore to forward the theories of consciousness that move us toward better explanations and ultimately, an understanding of why subjective experience evolved in living beings. Melo’s hypothesis moves us one step closer to this outcome, and I am very grateful to have been invited to comment on it.
Works Cited
1 Edervaldo José de Souza Melo, “Simulation, Self, and the Phenomenal Field: An Evolutionary Hypothesis on Consciousness,” no. 2026031661, preprint, Preprints, March 23, 2026, 2, https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202603.1661.v1.
2 Melo, “Simulation, Self, and the Phenomenal Field,” 3.
3 Melo, “Simulation, Self, and the Phenomenal Field,” 25.
4 Melo, “Simulation, Self, and the Phenomenal Field,” 16.
5 Melo, “Simulation, Self, and the Phenomenal Field,” 18.
6 Axel Cleeremans et al., “Consciousness Science: Where Are We, Where Are We Going, and What If We Get There?,” Frontiers in Science 3 (October 2025): 7, https://doi.org/10.3389/fsci.2025.1546279.
7 Melo, “Simulation, Self, and the Phenomenal Field,” 6.
8 Melo, “Simulation, Self, and the Phenomenal Field,” 28.