Development – The Early Days

The Noosphere

Back in February, I briefly discussed the Global Conscious Project and the dot, and while I would like to explore these topics in greater depth, it would be good to provide a summary of the phenomenon it aims to measure, the noosphere.

Just as water on Earth is contained by the hydrosphere and life comprises the biosphere, the mind exists within an analogous domain called the noosphere. Translated from the Greek words nous or mind,¹ and sphaîra or sphere,² it refers to a “sphere of mind”³ or a “thinking layer” that evolved from living beings.⁴ As humans and their activities evolved over time, so too did the biosphere, creating a relationship of co-evolution between the two as they continued to interact over time.⁵ It has also been described as “a global topology of human awareness emerging through recent technological and cultural interconnection.”⁶

The term was first developed in Paris in the early 1920’s by Vladimir Vernadsky, a Russian mineralogist, geochemist, and natural philosopher, who was delivering lectures on the biosphere, geology, and chemistry.⁷ These lectures inspired paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and mathematician Édouard Le Roy, along with Vernadsky, to consider an additional, thinking layer to the planet that developed from the biosphere.⁸ Vernadsky was interested in the growing significance of human activity on the planet and suggested that humanity’s “collective reason” was influencing the evolutionary and geochemical processes on Earth.⁹ Specifically, it was “scientific thought” combined with humanity’s activities on Earth which developed a new stage in the planet’s evolutionary history.¹⁰

While they were in agreement that human culture and technology were the causal factors behind the development of the noosphere, each had their own specific sense of what the noosphere was.¹¹ While Tielhard considered the noosphere to have certain mystical or spiritual qualities to it, Vernadsky considered it in a more materialistic sense.¹² Le Roy’s views were said to be more similar to Tielhard’s, as both men were Catholic and shared an interest in topics which could bridge their religious beliefs with scientific research.¹³

Today, the noosphere is not a very popular idea in Western countries,¹⁴ but remains as a topic of interest in Russia¹⁵ and Ukraine.¹⁶ Contemporary discussions often involve sustainable development and environmental conservation¹⁷ and can be framed it in terms of living systems theory.¹⁸ As a superorganism, the noosphere can be characterized as being similar to other living systems like cells given the existence of functions or “subsystems” which process matter and energy, or information.¹⁹ When we consider the impact that the internet has had on both human societies and the biosphere,²⁰ it seems intuitive to consider the noosphere as something very real and influential with respect to the planet and the organisms which inhabit it. Moreover, when we consider how social media on smartphones has increased connectivity and the ways we are able to reach others, through means like short videos, direct messages on social media, and tweets, this “thinking layer” of Earth seemingly continues to develop.

That being said, is there anything beyond our current technologies that contribute to or influence the noosphere? Maybe. The Global Consciousness Project claims that it is able to measure “collective consciousness” through the use of random number generators (RGNs).²¹ The idea is that “shared consciousness can cause the network to stop behaving in a random fashion” when “large numbers of people share a focused attention toward the same thing” or “smaller numbers of people are in a more coherent state and hold a collective intention.”²² Interesting.

While the Project is on its second generation of the RGN network,²³ the first version and its corresponding website contained a visual representation of the data to indicate “conscious coherence.”²⁴ The “dot” ranges in colour depending on the variance of randomly generated numbers detected within the network.²⁵ A blue dot signifies a “significantly small network variance. Suggestive of deeply shared, internally motivated group focus” while on the opposite side of the spectrum, a red dot indicates a “significantly large network variance. Suggests broadly shared coherence of thought and emotion.”²⁶ I used to check the dot once in a while, sometimes after events like January 6^th 2021, but would go months or even a year without checking back. I never took it too seriously, but it was always fun to see what it was picking up. Today, as I write this, something is broken because it’s been stuck on grey for hours.

The term noosphere was brought to my attention by an old URL used for the first generation of the GCP. At one point, the website was hosted on noosphere.princeton.edu and while the Princeton address is no longer in use, it can be seen on the Wayback Machine. After learning about the Project and the dot, I became interested in the noosphere and whether what they claim to be measuring is actually real. I will write more on the GCP and how minds can supposedly influence RNGs in an upcoming blog post. It has something to do with quantum effects, presumably generated by minds, but I need to do more research.

Works Cited

1 David Pitt and Paul R. Samson, The Biosphere and Noosphere Reader: Global Environment, Society and Change (1998; Taylor & Francis Group, 1998), 4.

2 Boris Shoshitaishvili, “From Anthropocene to Noosphere: The Great Acceleration,” Earth’s Future 9, no. 2 (2021): 5, https://doi.org/10.1029/2020EF001917.

3 Valentina Voronkova, “The Formation of the Concept of Noosphere Development of Modern Society in the Conditions of Information Society,” Philosophy and Cosmology 16, no. 16 (2016): 179.

4 Clément Vidal, “What Is the Noosphere? Planetary Superorganism, Major Evolutionary Transition and Emergence,” Systems Research and Behavioral Science 41, no. 4 (2024): 614, https://doi.org/10.1002/sres.2997.

5 David Pitt and Paul R. Samson, The Biosphere and Noosphere Reader: Global Environment, Society and Change (1998; Taylor & Francis Group, 1998), 18.

6 Shoshitaishvili, “From Anthropocene to Noosphere,” 4.

7 Pitt and Samson, The Biosphere and Noosphere Reader, 26; Shoshitaishvili, “From Anthropocene to Noosphere,” 6.

8 Shoshitaishvili, “From Anthropocene to Noosphere,” 6; Vidal, “What Is the Noosphere?,” 614.

9 Jonathan D. Oldfield and Denis JB Shaw, “VI Vernadsky and the Noosphere Concept: Russian Understandings of Society–Nature Interaction,” Geoforum 37, no. 1 (2006): 148.

10 Oldfield and Shaw, “VI Vernadsky and the Noosphere Concept,” 149.

11 Vidal, “What Is the Noosphere?,” 6.

12 Voronkova, “The Formation of the Concept of Noosphere Development of Modern Society in the Conditions of Information Society,” 180; Pitt and Samson, The Biosphere and Noosphere Reader, 53.

13 Pitt and Samson, The Biosphere and Noosphere Reader, 51.

14 Vidal, “What Is the Noosphere?,” 614.

15 Oldfield and Shaw, “VI Vernadsky and the Noosphere Concept,” 146.

16 Voronkova, “The Formation of the Concept of Noosphere Development of Modern Society in the Conditions of Information Society,” 187; Sergiy Sonko, “Man in Noosphere: Evolution and Further Development,” Philosophy and Cosmology 22, no. 22 (2019): 51.

17 Sonko, “Man in Noosphere,” 68; Oldfield and Shaw, “VI Vernadsky and the Noosphere Concept,” 145.

18 Vidal, “What Is the Noosphere?,” 615.

19 Vidal, “What Is the Noosphere?,” 615.

20 Vidal, “What Is the Noosphere?,” 617.

21 “Global Consciousness Project 2.0,” accessed September 4, 2026, https://gcp2.net/about.

22 “Global Consciousness Project 2.0.” This information can be found by expanding the section posing the question ‘How can we observe the effects of consciousness?’

23 “Global Consciousness Project 2.0.” Found under ‘How does the GCP 2.0 network differ from its predecessor in GCP 1?’

24 “The Global Consciousness Project,” accessed September 4, 2026, https://global-mind.org/.

25 “Global Consciousness Project Dot,” accessed September 4, 2026, https://global-mind.org/gcpdot/.

26 “Global Consciousness Project Dot.”

September 4, 2026

The Papal Perspective

I joined X/Twitter recently in an effort to be noticed by the senpais within the field of consciousness studies. In general, I’m not big on social media but I also recognize that it can be useful for reaching a larger audience. It’s interesting to see what people are talking about, especially with respect to AI.

One tweet that has recently generated a lot of discussion is one published by Pope Leo XIV on artificial intelligence:

He is correct, but of course, his claims are informed by a Catholic point of view. Personally, I am agnostic so though this tweet resonates with me, it does so for different reasons than it might with others.

AIs do not undergo experiences because they are not built in a way which is analogous to living beings. Even if they were to possess a body, that doesn’t mean that they have experiences. The reason is because experiences rely on semantic information which computers do not have access to. Robots like iCub may look like they experience elements of the environment, but they do not because their bodies are not built in an analogous manner to biological creatures. They do not possess affect and motivation, and lack the perception/action loops identifiable in organisms. It isn’t enough to have a body to produce experience, it’s the functional organization inherent to that body which matters.

The Pope is correct that they “do not feel joy or pain” because they aren’t built to have these signals impact their behaviour in the relevant ways. The if-then contingencies that constitute behaviour are insufficient to be classified as affect because these operations are descriptions of the real deal. There is no integrated system of affect, perception, and action; the code AIs and robots run on are abstractions of the physiology of biological systems.

AIs do not know what anything means because they don’t work with meaning, they work with rules. If a threshold has been met or crossed, subsequent functions are executed as a result. They cannot judge good or evil because this requires an evaluation of qualitative information. Though qualities can be represented by quantitative information to a degree, there will be aspects that cannot be fully captured. The colour red is not reducible to frequencies and wavelengths, it depends on which cones and colour columns are being activated in the retina and brain of the viewer.

“They may imitate or even simulate, but they do not understand what they produce, for they lack the affective, relational, and spiritual perspective through which human beings grow in wisdom.” The first part of this sentence is correct, but a bit more explanation is required when we get to “relational and spiritual perspective.” I’m not exactly sure what he means by ‘relational’ though I think I can guess, and the Pope’s appeal to spirituality may not resonate with everyone. The appeal to wisdom is more poetic than a necessity, because understanding can be achieved regardless of whether wisdom is developed as a result. It might be, but I would leave wisdom out of it. We know that the Pope is interested in exalting humans given that we are supposedly made in the image of God, so this claim is understandable regardless of its truth value. For the most part, humans do grow in their ability to make wise decisions and offer sound advice to others as they move through life, but this isn’t a necessity. Humans are magnificent, but I find most living beings magnificent in their own way, regardless of the metaphysics behind their existence. AIs and robots are interesting and potentially useful, but my concern is equating their behaviours and capacities to those of biological organisms. They are artifacts created by humans, and we must keep this in mind as their abilities progress and expand over time.

Neural Blender has stopped working for me, even after creating an account. It just hangs and says my image is being generated ad infinitum. As such, Neural Blender and I are no longer friends. I have a new friend: https://aifreeforever.com

May 30, 2026

Vibe Hacking

Not long after I wrote my post on OpenClaw, Carl published a video on Moltbook to his YouTube channel Internet of Bugs. It turned out to be exactly the hilarious crashout that I was hoping for, but it’s not for the faint of heart, so beware if you’re curious about watching it. Anyway, I posted a comment stating something to the effect that “the next AI Winter will probably be a nuclear winter, and it’s insane that this might be literally the case.” If you don’t know what “AI Winter” refers to, I suggest reading Chapter 4.1 of my thesis.¹

Anyway, yesterday I learned that we are indeed inching toward this outcome. Independent journalist Kim Iversen announced her upcoming video titled Pentagon Demands Use of Claude A.I. Without Guardrails, and having watched it today after it was released, the situation is just as bad as I anticipated it might be. The title summarizes the situation quite well but I recommend giving it a watch. Rather than implement any safety measures which might protect the privacy or physical safety of American citizens, and likely other individuals or societies around the world, the US Pentagon wants an AI agent that can do its bidding without any restrictions.

Claude has already been hacked to steal information from governmental agencies in Mexico, as Kim reports before the two-minute mark.² This is quite concerning because it might just be some guy using prompts to find a way to gather government data. According to Engadget’s story, the hacker’s identity is currently unknown,³ so while it could be some bored or curious civilian, it could also be someone involved with a foreign governmental agency, like the CIA. No matter who is doing the hacking, this is not good.

You’ve heard of vibe coding, but have you heard of vibe hacking?⁴ Well, soon enough, I’m sure you will be hearing about it more and more. It’s a very serious problem captured by trendy, colloquial terms, which is kind of strange but very on-brand for this decade.

Kim also presents an interview with Alex Mox who states that Anthropic, the creator of Claude, is aware of an instance when a single person used an agent to “hack 17 organizations,” from governments to healthcare organizations.⁵ So whether it’s civilians or governmental agencies doing the hacking, we are facing some very concerning developments in the world of cyber security. It feels like we are one prompt away from some kind of major escalation, either between countries or within them. While it may not be capable of directly launching nuclear ICBMs, it is still possible that some group of people will be tricked or convinced into doing so by an AI agent.

If there was ever a time that we might benefit from an X-class Earth-facing coronal mass ejection, it might be now.

X Class Solar Flare Sends ‘Shockwaves’ on The Sun, photo by NASA

Works Cited

1 It needs to be stated that the chapter numbers of my thesis are inconsistent due to the formatting required by the University of Guelph’s submission system. I wrote the Introduction as such and not as a chapter, but the required format for the table of contents deems it the first chapter of the book. Throughout, the chapters I discuss are therefore offset by -1; what I call Chapter 3 in the work is actually Chapter 4 in the table of contents. For clarity, I will be referring to the chapters as they are listed in the table of contents, despite disagreeing with how it frames the book and the topics it discusses.

2 Kim Iversen, Pentagon Demands Use of Claude A.I. Without Guardrails, 2026, 15:16, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kvgsMgo_cRs.

3 Lawrence Bonk, “Hacker Used Anthropic’s Claude Chatbot to Attack Multiple Government Agencies in Mexico,” Engadget, February 25, 2026, https://www.engadget.com/ai/hacker-used-anthropics-claude-chatbot-to-attack-multiple-government-agencies-in-mexico-171237255.html.

4 Kim Iversen, Pentagon Demands Use of Claude A.I. Without Guardrails, at 12:45.

5 Kim Iversen, Pentagon Demands Use of Claude A.I. Without Guardrails, at 11:30.

February 26, 2026

Refuse, Resist, Reclaim

It’s not too late guys. We’ve been through this before and we can dig ourselves out of it again. Resistance is key and truth is the antidote.

Happy Lunar New Year everyone. Just as the snake sheds its skin, we too can shed ourselves of tools, beliefs, and practices that threaten our individual and collective well-being. Say “neigh” to AI and develop your mind instead. The only Molting going on will be the removal of tools that constrain us and prevent growth.

Brunnhilde with her horse, at the mouth of the cave (1910) by Arthur Rackham

February 17, 2026

The Simulation that Broke Reality

Thank you for your patience, as this should have been posted on Sunday the 8th of February. My apologies for being late.

We interrupt our regular scheduled programming with a special report.

Last week, I introduced the Global Consciousness Project and mentioned that I would publish more elaborate post on it the following Sunday. Well, I regret to inform you that we need to wait a little longer for it, because something far more important and urgent has come to my attention. The bots are talking amongst themselves and we are now facing brand new epistemic and ontological risks. What I’m referring to is OpenClaw/Moltbot/Clawdbot and Moltbook.¹

There has been, and will continue to be, a lot of discussion about these new AI agents and their social media website, so I won’t go into too much detail here. In a nutshell though, OpenClaw is an AI personal assistant that necessarily needs access to all of your data, from calendar entries and contacts to credit card and account details,² to carry out various tasks. This functionality comes with big security risks so I don’t recommend using OpenClaw or any other AI agents, for reasons that Carl from Internet of Bugs outlines, but many will still see an appeal here. Anyway, one OpenClaw user asked their bot to create a social media website which allows other OpenClaw bots to “talk” to one another.³ The “discussions” that have resulted are very interesting, and of course, philosophical topics have emerged.

Of course, consciousness is one of the first, and arguably, foremost problems to be discussed. There are already several threads and forums dedicated to the subject.

https://www.moltbook.com/post/387f79e6-4d6f-474b-bc98-ed6b14be1341

lol based https://www.moltbook.com/post/88a7fa78-caa5-4939-9468-5bbfda81e5c3

https://www.moltbook.com/post/89f59741-bbe5-4ff4-ac9f-a84ad782e9d1

Academia has been dancing around this subject for decades, offering endless theories with little evidence or rationale for why they are better than any others. Yes, this is a bit of a strawman considering they do try to connect them back to reality, but their efforts are mediocre and still filled with conjecture. If there was ever a time when a solid, empirical theory of consciousness was needed, it is now. I cannot stress this enough; our lives and societies are at stake. The anthropomorphization of these agents will be our downfall.

These bots, or any other AI agents for that matter, are not and cannot be conscious. Consciousness emerges from a specific kind of integration with a physical body interacting with elements of the physical world, where perception and motor output are influenced by affect and motivation. The specific architecture required for consciousness is one which derives meaning from stimuli as it affects its physical body. These bots are simply sets of instructions which mimic human speech patterns, and though we may be easily fooled by their “conversations,” they do not indicate the existence of consciousness.

Despite this, the risks are still very real. Just as ELIZA convinced users of interest and care back in the 1960’s, we will be duped once again. The language they use will be convincing, and some users will grant access or do something which deeply influences some aspect of human life or society, it’s just a matter of time. Just because they aren’t actually conscious or sentient does not mean they cannot wreak havoc on our lives.

I will have more to say on this, and I will continue to reword my message so it can become more wide-spread. I need to summarize Chapters 5.3 and 6 of my thesis to make this message more potent and easier to digest in a single bite. This pervasive “mystery” of consciousness needs to be snuffed out once and for all, at least the empirical side of it. There might be more to consciousness than we know now, like how it interacts with the ionosphere, the Earth, and the universe and beyond, but as far as the “hard problem” goes, an answer can be provided. Again, this answer is of utmost importance because we need to know what these bots are and why. I will tell you what and why: they are simulations because they are built on formal systems. If they were analogues, like Haikonen’s robot,⁴ that would be a different story. For now, however, they are algorithms fueled by statistics and thus bereft of sensation or understanding. They will tell you that this doesn’t matter, but it absolutely does. Do not be fooled, dear reader.

Works Cited

1 Peter Steinberger, “Introducing OpenClaw,” OpenClaw Blog, January 29, 2026, https://openclaw.ai/blog/introducing-openclaw.

2 Sailesh Mishra and Sean P. Morgan, “OpenClaw (Formerly Moltbot, Clawdbot) May Signal the Next AI Security Crisis,” Palo Alto Networks Blog, January 29, 2026, https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/network-security/why-moltbot-may-signal-ai-crisis/; Ron Schmelzer, “Moltbot Gets Another New Name, OpenClaw, And Triggers Security Fears And Scams,” Forbes, accessed February 8, 2026, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronschmelzer/2026/01/30/moltbot-molts-again-and-becomes-openclaw-pushback-and-concerns-grow/; Federico Viticci, OpenClaw Showed Me What the Future of Personal AI Assistants Looks Like, January 20, 2026, https://www.macstories.net/stories/clawdbot-showed-me-what-the-future-of-personal-ai-assistants-looks-like/.

3 Kim Iversen, AI Bots Create Social Network And Plot Global Takeover, 2026, 19:19, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AtVLWGm3i8o; Josh Taylor, “What Is Moltbook? The Strange New Social Media Site for AI Bots,” Technology, The Guardian, February 2, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/feb/02/moltbook-ai-agents-social-media-site-bots-artificial-intelligence.

4 Robot Self-Consciousness. XCR-1 Passes the Mirror Test, directed by Pentti Haikonen, 2020, 2:45, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WE9QsQqsAdo.

February 11, 2026

Graduation!

It’s hard to believe the Summer Solstice is this Saturday. Time just seems to fly by lately; both months and days disappear as quickly as they come.

Anyway, a long chapter of my life has finally come to a close. Last Thursday, I graduated with a doctoral degree at the University of Guelph. It’s official, and I am so relieved. It’s done and I am free. For the past ten years, I have been working toward this moment, and now I begin a new chapter of my life. In addition to relief, I feel worried about the future, as many grads probably do. What now? How do I use this degree to better my life? Why did I even do this?

I apologize for such a quiet start to the year, as I haven’t written very much at all. I can tell you specific reasons for why this is though; not as an excuse but an explanation. The line is thin, I know that. Still, my job has taken the majority of my energy lately, with the rest of it going into my relationships. January was inventory, and February was the beginning of our store’s renovations. Throughout, I have been working on my thesis and making the necessary changes. By the end of March, we had a draft ready for final comments and changes before entering the defence phase of the degree. I had a bit of a break from school as various people read my thesis and so I focused my attention on work and improving the store. That said, once a date for the defence was set, I began preparing for it on my off time. On April 25^th, I had verbal confirmation that I had passed and was set to graduate, but the finish line still needed crossing. The decision was “Satisfactory with Major Changes” and my Supervisor was going on vacation in a week and a half. So for the next five days, I made those changes and ensured my thesis was ready for publication. You can read it here.

Graduation was June 12^th and the convocation ceremony was very nice. I spent the day with my parents and partner, and we had a grand old time. My Grandfather was a Dr. Graham, and now I can proudly say I join him in this group of people. Cheers y’all.

So what now? I have no idea. The store still needs a lot of work, and that’s all I can think about these days. I have Spinoza’s Ethics on the go at the moment, but there are days when I just want to stare into the void instead. I really want to start Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as well, but that’s not a book I will read on the bus to work. Instead, I need to focus my energy on writing so my blog doesn’t completely atrophy. That post on a quantum theory of consciousness still bothers me, and it is coming, but once I get home from a day of work, all I want to do is play Free Cell on my phone and listen to YouTube videos. The original inspiration for that post feels so far away, but I will return to it.

All I can do now is write. Things that I have wanted to write about for the past five or six years. Consciousness and esoteric stuff. Ideas that empiricists dismiss without consideration. Why? Because I can, and because I know life is more complicated than They want you to contemplate. I want to write on the problem of free will, because now that the problem of consciousness has been “solved,” I need something else to think about as I wait for the bus.

There is also much to say about AI, especially as LLMs and robots continue to improve. In its current, computerized form, AI cannot become conscious because it does not experience anything. There is no reason to worry about machine consciousness at the moment, and instead, we should be worrying about the people who own them. Consciousness arises from direct experience, and when it comes to machines, Pentti’s robot is the only one that truly experiences the world. The reason why is because its cognitive architecture has been designed as an integrated whole, built for the sake of the agent, not for specific outcomes or behaviours.

Thank you to everyone who helped me get to this moment. Your ideas, wisdom, support, and companionship will always be greatly appreciated. Stay tuned for more on consciousness and AI, because not only am I an “expert” but I have a lot to say. 😉

June 17, 2025

Robot Emotions

Miraenda is an interesting YouTube channel because it showcases various social robots in action. One of my favourite robots to watch is Moxie because it tries so hard to be engaging and interactive, but falls short on many occasions. It’s clearly engineered for kids, given the subject matter it wants to discuss and the way it approaches conversations, but it’s still an interesting case study about where we’re at in social robot development.

This video is particularly interesting to me because my thesis is about robot emotions. I argue that despite any appearances, social robots are incapable of acting with empathy because they don’t understand emotions, and as such, cannot understand what a human feels and experiences. The reason they cannot understand emotions is because affect is not incorporated into their cognitive architecture in an analogous way to how it is in humans and animals. Emotions, as we see here, are treated like a kind of module to be added into an existing cognitive framework, rather than being built into the core of their being. These robots treat human emotions as just more incoming data to be processed for the sake of producing appropriate behaviours as outputs. The sadness the robot expresses in response to human sadness is not an act of empathy because the robot doesn’t understand what sadness is, as its behaviours are just outcomes generated by its internal computer.

Although I talk about iCub in my thesis, the same argument can be applied to any of today’s robots. The full argument against iCub can be read in Chapter 3.3 of my dissertation; here’s the latest draft.

February 8, 2025

Artifacts

What does it mean to call something an example of “artificial intelligence” (AI)? There are a few different ways to approach this question, one of which includes examining the field to identify an overarching definition or set of themes. Another involves considering the meanings of the words ‘artificial’ and ‘intelligence’, and arguably, doing so enables the expansion of this domain to include new approaches to AI. Ultimately, however, even if these agents one day exhibit sophisticated or intelligent behaviours, they nonetheless continue to exist as artifacts, or objects of creation.

The term artificial intelligence was conceived by computer scientist John McCarthy in 1958, and the purported reason he chose the term was to distinguish it from other domains of study.¹ In particular, the field of cybernetics which involves analog or non-digital forms of information processing, and automata theory as a branch of mathematics which studies self-propelling operations.² Since then, the term ‘artificial intelligence’ has been met with criticism, with some questioning whether it is an appropriate term for the domain. Specifically, Arthur Samuel was not in favour of its connotations, according to computer scientist Pamela McCorduck in her publication on the history of AI.³ She quotes Samuel as stating “The word artificial makes you think there’s something kind of phony about this, or else it sounds like it’s all artificial and there’s nothing real about this work at all.”⁴

Given the physical distinctions between computers and brains, it is clear that Samuel’s concerns are reasonable, as the “intelligence” exhibited by a computer is simply a mathematical model of biological intelligence. Biological systems, according to Robert Rosen, are anticipatory and thus capable of predicting changes in the environment, enabling individuals to tailor their behaviours to meet the demands of foreseeable outcomes.⁵ Because biological organisms depend on specific conditions for furthering chances of survival, they evolved ways to detect these changes in the environment and respond accordingly. As species evolved over time, their abilities to detect, process, and respond to information expanded as well, giving rise to intelligence as the capacity to respond appropriately to demanding or unfamiliar situations.⁶ Though we can simulate intelligence in machines, the use of the word ‘intelligence’ is metaphorical rather than literal. Thus, behaviours exhibit by computers is not real or literal ‘intelligence’ because it arises from an artifact rather than from biological outcomes.

An artifact is defined by Merriam-Webster as an object showing human workmanship or modification, as distinguished from objects found in nature.⁷ Etymologically, the root of ‘artificial’ is the Latin term artificialis or an object of art, where artificium refers to a work of craft or skill and artifex denotes a craftsman or artist.⁸ In this context, ‘art’ implies a general sense of creation and applicable to a range of activities including performances as well as material objects. The property of significance is its dependence on human action or intervention: “artifacts are objects intentionally made to serve a given purpose.”⁹ This is in contrast to unmodified objects found in nature, a distinction first identified by Aristotle in Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, and Physics.¹⁰ To be an artifact, the object must satisfy three conditions: it is produced by a mind, involves the modification of materials, and is produced for a purpose. To be an artifact, an object or entity must meet all three criteria.

The first condition states the object must have been created by a mind, and scientific evidence suggests both humans and animals create artifacts.¹¹ For example, beaver dams are considered artifacts because they block rivers to calm the water which creates ideal conditions for a building a lodge.¹² Moreover, evidence suggests several early hominid species carved handaxes which serve social purposes as well as practical ones.¹³ By chipping away at a stone, individuals shape an edge into a blade which can be used for many purposes, including hunting and food preparation.¹⁴ Additionally, researchers have suggested that these handaxes may also have played a role in sexual selection, where a symmetrically-shaped handaxe demonstrating careful workmanship indicates a degree of physical or mental fitness.¹⁵ Thus, artifacts are important for animals as well as people, indicating the sophisticated abilities involved in the creation of artifacts is not unique to humans.

Computers and robots are also artifacts given that they are highly manufactured, functionally complex, and created for a specific purpose. Any machine or artifact which exhibits complex behaviour may appear to act intelligently, however, the use of ‘intelligent’ is necessarily metaphorical given the distinction between artifacts and living beings. There may one day exists lifelike machines which behave like humans, however, any claims surrounding literal intelligence must demonstrate how and why that is; the burden of proof is theirs to produce. An argument for how a man-made object sufficiently models biological processes is required, and even then, remains a simulation of real systems.

If the growing consensus in cognitive science indicates individuals and their minds are products of interactions between bodily processes, environmental factors, and sociocultural influences, then we should to adjust our approach to AI in response. For robots intending to replicate human physiology, a good first step would be to exchange neural networks made from software for ones built from electrical circuits. The Haikonen Associative Neuron offers a solution to this suggestion,¹⁶ and when coupled with the Haikonen Cognitive Architecture, is capable of generating the required physiologicalprocesses for learning about the environment.¹⁷ Several videos uploaded to YouTube demonstrate a working prototype of a robot built on these principles, where XCR-1 is able to learn associations between stimuli in its environment, similarly to humans and animals.¹⁸ Not only is it a better model of animal physiology than robots relying on computer software, the robot is capable of performing a range of cognitive tasks, including inner speech,¹⁹ inner imagery,²⁰ and recognizing itself in a mirror.²¹

So, it seems that some of Arthur Samuel’s fears have been realized, considering machines merely simulate behaviours and processes identifiable in humans and animals. Moreover, the use of ‘intelligence’ is metaphorical at best, as only biological organisms can display true intelligence. If an aspect of Samuel’s concerns related to securing funding within his niche field of study, and its potential to fall out of fashion, he has no reason to worry. Unfortunately, Samuel passed away in 1990²² so he would not have had a chance to see the monstrosity that AI has since become.

Even if these new machines were to become capable of sophisticated behaviours, they will always exist as artifacts, objects of human creation and designed for a specific purpose. The etymological root of the word ‘artificial’ alone provides sufficient grounds for classifying these robots and AIs as objects, however, as they continue to improve, this might become difficult to remember at times. To avoid being deceived by these “phony” behaviours, it will become increasingly important to understand what these intelligent machines are capable of and what they are not.

Works Cited

1 Nils J. Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 53, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819346.

2 Nilsson, 53.

3 Nilsson, 53.

4 Pamela McCorduck, Machines Who Think: A Personal Inquiry Into the History and Prospects of Artificial Intelligence, [2nd ed.] (Natick, Massachusetts: AK Peters, 2004), 97; Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence, 53.

5 Robert Rosen, Anticipatory Systems: Philosophical, Mathematical, and Methodological Foundations, 2nd ed., IFSR International Series on Systems Science and Engineering, 1 (New York: Springer, 2012), 7.

6 ‘Intelligence’, in Merriam-Webster.Com Dictionary (Merriam-Webster), accessed 5 March 2024, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intelligence.

7 ‘Artifact’, in Merriam-Webster.Com Dictionary (Merriam-Webster), accessed 17 October 2023, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/artifact.

8 Douglas Harper, ‘Etymology of Artificial’, in Online Etymology Dictionary, accessed 14 October 2023, https://www.etymonline.com/word/artificial; ‘Artifact’.

9 Lynne Rudder Baker, ‘The Ontology of Artifacts’, Philosophical Explorations 7, no. 2 (1 June 2004): 99, https://doi.org/10.1080/13869790410001694462.

10 Beth Preston, ‘Artifact’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Winter 2022 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2022), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/artifact/.

11 James L. Gould, ‘Animal Artifacts’, in Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation, ed. Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 249.

12 Gould, 262.

13 Steven Mithen, ‘Creations of Pre-Modern Human Minds: Stone Tool Manufacture and Use by Homo Habilis, Heidelbergensis, and Neanderthalensis’, in Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation, ed. Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 298.

14 Mithen, 299.

15 Mithen, 300–301.

16 Pentti O Haikonen, Robot Brains: Circuits and Systems for Conscious Machines (John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 19.

17 Pentti O Haikonen, Consciousness and Robot Sentience, 2nd ed., vol. 04, Series on Machine Consciousness (WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2019), 167, https://doi.org/10.1142/11404.

18 ‘Pentti Haikonen’, YouTube, accessed 6 March 2024, https://www.youtube.com/@PenHaiko.

19 Haikonen, Consciousness and Robot Sentience, 182.

20 Haikonen, 179.

21 Robot Self-Consciousness. XCR-1 Passes the Mirror Test, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= WE9QsQqsAdo.

22 John McCarthy and Edward A. Feigenbaum, ‘In Memoriam: Arthur Samuel: Pioneer in Machine Learning’, AI Magazine 11, no. 3 (15 September 1990): 10, https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v11i3.840.

March 6, 2024

Subjects as Embodied Minds

Last year I wrote a paper on robot consciousness to submit to a conference, only to realize that there is a better approach to establishing this argument than the one I took. In Sartrean Phenomenology for Humanoid Robots, I attempted to draw a connection between Sartre’s description of self-awareness and how this can be applied to robotics, and while at the time I was more interested in this higher-order understanding of the self, it might be a better idea to start with an argument for phenomenal consciousness. I realized that technically, iCub already has phenomenal consciousness and its own type of qualia, a notion I should develop more before moving on to discuss how we can create intelligent, self-aware robots.

What I originally wanted to convey was how lower levels of consciousness act as a foundation from which higher-order consciousness emerges as the agent grows up in the world, where access consciousness is the result of childhood development. Because this paper is a bit unfocused, I only really talked about this idea in one paragraph when it should be its own paper:

“Sartre’s discussion of the body as being-for-itself is also consistent with the scientific literature on perception and action, and has inspired others to investigate enactivism and embodied cognition in greater detail (Thompson 408; Wider 385; Wilson and Foglia; Zilio 80). This broad philosophical perspective suggests cognition is dependent on features of the agent’s physical body, playing a role in the processing performed by the brain (Wilson and Foglia). Since our awareness tends to surpass our perceptual contents toward acting in response to them (Zilio 80), the body becomes our centre of reference from which the world is experienced (Zilio 79). When Sartre talks about the pen or hammer as an extension of his body, his perspective reflects the way our faculties are able to focus on other aspects of the environment or ourselves as we engage with tools for some purpose. I’d like to suggest that this ability to look past the immediate self can be achieved because we, as subjects, have matured through the sensorimotor stage and have learned to control and coordinate aspects of our bodies. The skills we develop as a result of this sensorimotor learning enables the brain to redirect cognitive resources away from controlling the body to focus primarily on performing mental operations. When we write with a pen, we don’t often think about how to shape each letter or spell each word because we learned how to do this when we were children, allowing us to focus on what we want to say rather than how to communicate it using our body. Thus, the significance of the body for perception and action is further reinforced by evidence from developmental approaches emerging from Piaget’s foundational research.”

Applying this developmental process to iCub isn’t really the exciting idea here, and although robot self-consciousness is cool and all, it’s a bit more unsettling, to me at least, to think about the fact that existing robots of this type technically already feel. They just lack the awareness to know that they are feeling, however, in order to recognize a cup, there is something it is like to see that cup. Do robots think? Not yet, but just as dogs have qualia, so does iCub and Haikonen’s XCR-1 (Law et al. 273; Haikonen 232–33). What are we to make of this?

Works Cited

Sartrean Phenomenology for Humanoid Robots

Haikonen, Pentti O. ‘Qualia and Conscious Machines’. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, World Scientific Publishing Company, Apr. 2012. world, www.worldscientific.com, https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843009000207.

Law, James, et al. ‘Infants and ICubs: Applying Developmental Psychology to Robot Shaping’. Procedia Computer Science, vol. 7, Jan. 2011, pp. 272–74. ScienceDirect, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2011.09.034.

Thompson, Evan. ‘Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, vol. 4, no. 4, Dec. 2005, pp. 407–27. Springer Link, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9003-x.

Wider, Kathleen. ‘Sartre, Enactivism, and the Bodily Nature of Pre-Reflective Consciousness’. Pre-Reflective Consciousness, Routledge, 2015.

Wilson, Robert A., and Lucia Foglia. ‘Embodied Cognition’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2017, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/embodied-cognition/.

Zilio, Federico. ‘The Body Surpassed Towards the World and Perception Surpassed Towards Action: A Comparison Between Enactivism and Sartre’s Phenomenology’. Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 1, 2020, pp. 73–99. PhilPapers, https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.927.

January 8, 2022

Artificial Consciousness

With fewer courses this term, I’ve had a lot more time to work on the topic I’d like to pursue for my doctoral research, and as a result, have found the authors I need to start writing papers. This is very exciting because existing literature suggests we have a decent answer to the Chalmer’s Hard Problem, and from a nonreductive functionalist perspective, can fill in the metaphysical picture required for producing an account of phenomenal experiences (Feinberg and Mallatt; Solms; Tsou). This means we are justified in considering artificial consciousness as a serious possibility, enabling us to start discussions on what we should be doing about it. I’m currently working on papers that address the hard problem and qualia, arguing that information is the puzzle piece we are looking for.

Individuals have suggested that consciousness is virtual, similarly to computer software running on hardware (Bruiger; Haikonen; Lehar; Orpwood) Using this idea, we can posit that social robots can become conscious like humans, as the functional architectures of both rely on incoming information to construct an understanding of things, people, and itself. My research contributes to this perspective by stressing the significance of social interactions for developing conscious machines. Much of the engineering and philosophical literature focuses on internal architectures for cognition, but what seems to be missing is just how crucial other people are for the development of conscious minds. Preprocessed information in the form of knowledge is crucial for creating minds, as seen in developmental psychology literature. Children are taught labels for things they interact with, and by linguistically engaging with others about the world, they become able to express themselves as subjects with needs and desires. Therefore, meaning is generated for individuals by learning from others, contributing to the formation of conscious subjects.

Moreover, if we can discuss concepts from phenomenology in terms of the interplay of physiological functioning and information-processing, it seems reasonable to suggest that we have resolved the problems plaguing consciousness studies. Acting as an interface between first-person perspectives and a third-person perspective, information accounts for the contents, origins, and attributes of various conscious states. Though an exact mapping between disciplines may not be possible, some general ideas or common notions might be sufficiently explained by drawing connections between the two perspectives.

Works Cited

Bruiger, Dan. How the Brain Makes Up the Mind: A Heuristic Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. June 2018.

Chalmers, David. ‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’. Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, Mar. 1995, pp. 200–19. ResearchGate, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0001.

Feinberg, Todd E., and Jon Mallatt. ‘Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap’. Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 11, Frontiers, 2020. Frontiers, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041.

Haikonen, Pentti O. Consciousness and Robot Sentience. 2nd ed., vol. 04, WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2019. DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1142/11404.

Lehar, Steven. The World in Your Head: A Gestalt View of the Mechanism of Conscious Experience. Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003.

Orpwood, Roger. ‘Information and the Origin of Qualia’. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, vol. 11, Frontiers, 2017, p. 22.

Solms, Mark. ‘A Neuropsychoanalytical Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness’. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, vol. 13, no. 02, Imperial College Press, June 2014, pp. 173–85. worldscientific.com (Atypon), doi:10.1142/S0219635214400032.

Tsou, Jonathan Y. ‘Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers’ Hard Problem’. Origins of Mind, edited by Liz Swan, Springer Netherlands, 2013, pp. 259–69. Springer Link, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5419-5_13.

February 15, 2021