It’s hard to believe it is already December, this year seemed to fly by so quickly. Since my last post in late August, I’ve been primarily focusing on finishing up my thesis, which is why I haven’t added anything new here in quite a while. There are a few things I want to write about, but I really didn’t want to spend time working on them until I was closer to finishing. I have also been distracted with some sewing that I had put off for months, if not years. My job has inspired me to start up again, and of course, has also inspired me to begin working on additional projects. I am trying to finish what I have started before beginning something new, but that doesn’t always go very well. Eventually, photos will be posted. I’ve also been a little burnt out with writing, so the transition back to the material world has been a welcomed one.
Currently, I have a rough draft of my thesis ready for review, and in the new year, we will be setting a date to defend. I am very much looking forward to graduating so I can start thinking about a new YouTube video. It will probably be on my thesis, namely robot empathy and experience, but we’ll see. Many of these blog posts will also likely become videos in the future.
Throughout my research, a number of happy accidents and strange coincidences have occurred, with the latest one appearing a few months ago. I wanted to write on it back then, but it’s a minor point that isn’t all that ground-breaking today. It would have been when Hubert Dreyfus was writing on it, and essentially it’s this idea that there are two forms of knowledge: explicit or fact-based knowledge, and what Dreyfus calls know-how.1 I had written a post on the idea of belief involving a relationship, citing an Iain McGilchrist’s paper which distinguishes between the French terms savior and connaître. Here again, reading Dreyfus’s What Computers Still Can’t Do, I see this distinction being made. Dreyfus’s argument is that it is impossible or nearly impossible to transform know-how into explicit knowledge which could be programmed into a computer. He appeals to phenomenology to demonstrate why this is the case, specifically that human life is organized around subjective experiences of the world. In a nutshell. The idea is that we ultimately act according to a world we have unconsciously or subconsciously modeled internally based on how it appears to the experiencing individual. For example, I don’t think about placing one foot in front of another as I walk, my attention is instead on what I want to eat later, and walking is merely an automatic skill I acquired as a baby. These kinds of skills are difficult to program into a computer using symbolic-reasoning, says Dreyfus, so an approach involving robots or AIs which learn from experience is a better path to take.
There isn’t much else to say on this distinction, other than it appearing again months after my post on McGilchrist. Connecting this idea of know-how back to belief, where belief “emerges through commitment and experience,”2 we entrust that our bodies and the bodies of others can perform some action or feat. For example, even if I have never made a certain recipe before, I believe I can do it, or I believe that my Grandma can make it, given our experiences with other recipes. The truth of this becomes apparent when I “make a move”3 to give it a go; it either turns out alright or it doesn’t.
Anyway, the post I am working on currently is a connection between some ideas about consciousness discussed in Bentov’s Stalking the Wild Pendulum and panpsychism. There is a neat overlap that can be used to create an explanation for the feasibility of panpsychism, depending on how much Bentov’s ideas resonate with you. I used to be very dismissive of panpsychism until I read Bentov’s book, and so in an attempt to be charitable to some crazy ideas surrounding consciousness, I would like to explore these ideas with an open mind. Many people will not appreciate the degree of speculation and conjecture involved, but hey, life is short and very strange at times, so why not.
Works Cited
1 Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992), xi.
2 Iain McGilchrist, “Cerebral Lateralization and Religion: A Phenomenological Approach,” Religion, Brain & Behavior 9, no. 4 (October 2, 2019): 328, https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2019.1604411.
3 McGilchrist, 329.