Section 6 of Miller and Record’s Justified Belief in a Digital Age provides suggestions for responsible belief formation given the role and influence algorithms possess in today’s society. The notions they present, however, are vague and appear to be shortsighted. They suggest “subjects can use existing competencies for gaining information from traditional media such as newspapers to supplement internet-filtered information and therefore at least partly satisfy the responsibility to determine whether it is biased or incomplete” (130), except the nature of ‘traditional media’ (TM) has shifted. Since the widespread adoption of social media platforms and online news streaming, TM has seen an increase in competition as small and independent news websites are also shared between users. Importantly, expectations for endless novel content has pressured TM to keep up by increasingly producing editorials, commentary, and speculation. Pundits receive as much airtime as journalists due to the nature of consumer demand, subsequently influencing belief formation. The notion of political bias in TM is also a large concern, where journalistic integrity and credibility ranges drastically between companies. Additionally, TM is more likely to be subsumed under an umbrella corporation with an agenda of its own, whether political, financial, or religious. Deference to TM has always been associated with epistemic risks, and reasons to be sceptical of stories and information are growing as technology modifies our consumption habits.
Further down on page 130, it is recommended one explore outside their personalized feed by investigating others’ posting history: “Instead he can casually visit their Facebook profiles and see whether they have posted an interesting story that the automatically generated news feed missed.”. While this does improve chances of being exposed to diverse content, it is most effective when one reads the feeds of contrasting personalities. Close friends and family members may hold similar attitudes, values, or perspectives which do not adequately challenge one’s suspicions or beliefs. Opposing views, however, may not be justified or well-formed, and ‘opposing’ is open for interpretation. On page 131 the authors state: “… suggests, internet sites, such as political blogs, may refer their readers to alternative views, for example, by linking to opposing sites, out of a commitment to pluralism.” If this program were to be followed, it would suggest religious individuals with dogmatic beliefs are epistemically irresponsible. This may be an unexciting verdict to a philosopher, but it is difficult to determine whether this normative approach to belief formation is suitable for all humans.
Epistemic justification is complicated in the digital age, and it is unclear how much research is required to fulfill one’s epistemic responsibilities. If one stumbles across a scientific claim, it seems reasonable that one ought to determine whether the news headline matches the outcome of the study. Considering the replication crisis has further complicated this process, how much scientific scrutiny is required at this point? If a reader has an understanding of scientific methodology and access to the article, is it irresponsible if one does not examine the methods section? As ideal as epistemic responsibility seems, it might be unattainable due to the nature of the internet and human emotion. Our ability to access such a wealth of knowledge, even when curtailed by algorithms, generates an infinite regress of duties and uncertainty, a fact unlikely to sit well with the average voter.
Miller, Boaz, and Isaac Record. “Justified belief in a digital age: On the epistemic implications of secret Internet technologies.” Episteme 10.2 (2013): 117-134.